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We investigate the extent to which the scheduled release of macroeconomic indicators 
affects the acquirer’s value in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). We find that M&As 
announced on days of the release of key macroeconomic indicators (i.e. indicator days) 
realize higher announcement period risk-adjusted returns compared to counterparts 
announced on non-indicator days. The positive wealth effect is due to the higher market 
attention on indicator days, which is particularly relevant for smaller M&As that are not 
usually exposed to significant investor scrutiny. The results hold after addressing self-
selection bias concerns. We also find that firms announcing M&As on indicator days are 
more likely to “listen” to the market’s feedback. 
 
Keywords: Macroeconomic indicators; Investor attention; Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As); Small deals; Risk-adjusted returns; Buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
 





Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) represent one of the most important forms of 
corporate investment that are valuation-complex, financially demanding and 
informationally intense (Moeller et al., 2005). They can have critical implications for the 
valuation and growth prospects of the merging firms and, undoubtedly, are of great 
importance to the economy as a whole (Alexandridis et al., 2017; Bao and Edmans, 
2011).1 M&As attract media attention and place merging firms in the spotlight of 
investors and financial analysts. Indeed, a large number of studies have investigated the 
extent to which M&As create or destroy value for merging firms and have shown that, on 
average, acquirers experience significant wealth losses that vary according to several 
firm- and deal-specific factors (see Eckbo (2009) and Alexandridis et al. (2017) for 
comprehensive reviews). 
Prior studies have shown that the pricing effects of new information may vary with 
the level of investor attention in the marketplace (Barber and Odean, 2008; Da et al., 
2011). Accordingly, a noisy or imperfect assessment of M&A announcements by equity 
investors raises significant challenges for acquirers. First, an imperfect market response 
means that a significant part of the value added from an acquisition may not be 
immediately and fully reflected in the acquirer’s stock price. Second, an incomplete 
market assessment at the time of the M&A announcement prevents an acquirer’s 
management team from extracting valuable information from market prices about the 
deal’s synergy potential and the prospects of its completion. Evidence suggests that 
adverse market feedback to an M&A announcement incentivizes an acquirer’s managers 
to re-examine a deal and possibly cancel it at a later stage (Kau et al., 2008; Luo, 2005). 
Thus, an inattentive market’s assessment of an acquisition announcement can reduce the 
reliability of the feedback channel and hinder an acquirer’s ability to “learn” from market 
price movements. 
In this paper, we trace the investor-alerting impact of the release of macroeconomic 
indicators on the market’s reaction to M&A announcements. There is ample evidence on 
the role of macroeconomic announcements as a “stimulus” that leads investors to 
reassess their overall equity valuations (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Stern et al., 2010). On 
                                                          
1 Bao and Edmans (2011) state that “The total value of M&A announced by a U.S. acquirer in 2007 was $2.1 trillion, 
around 15% of GDP” (p. 2286). Similarly, Alexandridis et al. (2017) demonstrate that “During the last 25 years mega-
deals comprised more than 85% (94% in 2015) of our overall M&As sample’s market value representing the bulk of 
inorganic corporate investment and an important part of the U.S. economy (more than 5% of GDP in 2015)” (p. 633). 
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such days, investors become more attentive to market events, as they await new 
macroeconomic data that will assist their decision-making on whether or not to re-
balance their investment portfolios (Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2002). Along these 
lines, Chen et al. (2018) also find that equity investors become more attentive to firm-
specific announcements when new macroeconomic data is released. Accordingly, in the 
realm of M&As, we expect the deals announced on indicator days to be subject to a 
stronger, and more complete, market reaction than the deals announced on other days. 
We expect the consequential effect of investor attention to be more pronounced in 
small deals. Small companies have a limited shareholder base, low share turnover, and 
poor analyst coverage, which makes them subject to limited market scrutiny. These 
factors may complicate the forecasting of synergies (Da et al., 2011; Lang et al., 2004; Roll, 
1988; Zhang, 2006). There is substantial theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting 
that, in general, equity investors focus on large events rather than small firm-specific ones 
(Barber and Odean, 2008; Peng and Xiong, 2006). Hence, a significant part of the value 
gains arising from small M&As might be overlooked by equity investors at the time of the 
deal’s announcement unless the level of investor attention is high, as it is likely to be on 
indicator days. Moreover, the partial resolution of macroeconomic uncertainty within a 
highly attentive market is more consequential for small acquisitions due to the high 
sensitivity of small firms’ business prospects to the aggregate economic conditions 
(Ghosal and Loungani, 2000; Kang et al., 2014; Morikawa, 2016).2 
We provide strong support for the above predictions based on a comprehensive 
sample of 11,605 U.S. domestic M&As announced between 1986 and 2016. Acquirers in 
deals announced on indicator days realize 0.45% higher three-day Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR), on average, than acquirers in deals announced on non-indicator days.3 We 
also find that this wealth effect is more pronounced in the case of smaller M&As. Smaller 
deals announced on indicator days yield, on average, 0.81% higher acquirer three-day 
CAR than smaller deals announced on non-indicator days. This effect is particularly 
evident in cases where the acquirer is also a small firm and subject to limited market 
attention.4 
                                                          
2 Vuolteenaho (2002) and Petkova (2006) show that macroeconomic factors are key contributors to the variation in 
expected returns. 
3 In this paper the terms “indicator days” and “macro-indicator announcement days” are used interchangeably. 
4 In general, acquisitions of small companies have been widely documented to be value-enhancing investments for the 
acquiring firms’ shareholders (Alexandridis et al., 2017; Faccio et al., 2006; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Fuller et al., 
2002). Due to their low profile, acquisitions of small companies are generally not driven by conflicting managerial 
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We also provide robust evidence suggesting that the post-acquisition drift in the 
valuation of small-target acquirers announcing their deals on indicator days is small 
relative to counterpart deals announced on non-indicator days. This result supports the 
view that high investor alertness on indicator days allows for a relatively accurate 
assessment of the potential wealth effects associated with small M&As.5 Evidence from 
the choice of M&A announcement timing shows that acquirers that are capable of creating 
significant synergies from their acquisitions (Golubov et al., 2015) are generally likely to 
announce their small M&As on indicator days. 
We demonstrate how increased attention to small M&As on indicator 
announcement days can be costly for acquirers when macroeconomic indicators fail to 
effectively reduce economic uncertainty (Amador and Weill, 2010; Kandel and Zilberfarb, 
1999). In particular, the release of macroeconomic news can provide incomplete 
information and lead economic agents to struggle when making informed decisions based 
on public and private signals (Amador and Weill, 2010). Accordingly, M&As exposed to 
high market attention at times when the release of macroeconomic data is not 
successfully eliminating economic uncertainty – an outcome that cannot be accurately 
predicted ex-ante – can become subject to higher uncertainty discounts (see Vuolteenaho 
(2002) and Petkova, (2006)). Evidently, we show that the small M&As exposed to 
increased market attention on indicator announcement days are associated with 
significant acquirer losses when the release of new macroeconomic data does not 
effectively reduce economic uncertainty. Such losses can be as high as 2% in the 
announcement period CAR. 
Further, we provide evidence from both switching regression analysis and 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) which suggests that acquirers announcing small deals 
experience between a 0.50% to a 1% improvement in their announcement period CAR 
when the announcement is made on an indicator day rather than a non-indicator day. 
Moreover, we show that in cases where economic uncertainty remains high despite the 
                                                          
considerations, such as an acquirer’s empire-building impulses (Moeller et al., 2004; Morck et al., 1990; Roll, 1986). 
Instead, they are driven by economic and strategic perspectives and are carefully chosen for their high-growth 
potential (Moeller et al., 2004). 
5 This fits within the context of an influential literature. Savor and Wilson (2013) show that indicator days play a 
significant explanatory role in the risk-return paradigm. The authors find that over 60% of the cumulative equity risk 
premium is earned on days when inflation rates, unemployment figures, and monetary policy decisions are released. 
Li et al. (2014) further demonstrate how adding macroeconomic factors to forecasting models offers superior forecasts 
of firm performance. In the Vuolteenaho (2002) model, macroeconomic factors can be as relevant as cash-flow 
projections in explaining stock returns. Our evidence, in turn, shows that the alerting impact of macroeconomic news 
has a consequential role in influencing the market’s assessment of M&As, especially in the case of small target M&As. 
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release of new macroeconomic data, acquirers face significant losses of up to 1% in their 
announcement period CAR. These results suggest that exposing an acquirer to significant 
market scrutiny at the time of the release of key macro-indicators is subject to a trade-
off. On the one hand, the increased market scrutiny can enable positive synergies 
associated with M&As to be reflected in an acquirer’s CAR. On the other hand, the failure 
of macroeconomic news to reduce uncertainty can expose an acquirer’s valuation to 
significant discounts. 
Finally, in the spirit of Li and Tong's (2018) emphasis on the role of uncertainty in 
influencing the valuation of M&As, we examine how the market’s reaction helps acquirers 
re-assess their commitment to a deal and reduce their valuation uncertainty. In 
particular, we test whether a significant negative market feedback to a deal around days 
of increased market attention (i.e. indicator days) increases the likelihood of its 
withdrawal. We provide evidence suggesting that acquirers of small companies “listen” 
to the market’s feedback around M&As announced on indicator days. We find that small 
deals receiving significant negative initial market reaction on indicator days are twice as 
likely to be withdrawn compared to equivalent deals announced on non-indicator days. 
Furthermore, we find that this effect is only operative when the market does not 
experience significant spikes in volatility around indicator days. 
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, we provide novel 
evidence from the field of M&A on the alerting impact of macroeconomic news. Indeed, 
the effect of macroeconomic news on acquirer value in the market for corporate control 
has been ignored to date, despite M&As representing one of the most important forms of 
corporate investment. 
Second, our findings offer evidence regarding the timing of M&A announcements. 
Prior studies have shown that companies take into account developments in the stock 
market when choosing the appropriate timing of earnings (DeHaan et al., 2015; Doyle and 
Magilke, 2009) and dividends announcements (see Michaely et al., 2016 for a review). 
Our results offer a new dimension to this literature by demonstrating how the scheduled 
release of macro-indicators motivates corporations to release their M&A-related news on 
indicator days. Moreover, our results highlight the trade-off that acquirers face between 
receiving higher levels of attention for their announcements and exposing themselves to 




Third, we contribute to the literature on the relevance of market feedback in 
corporate decision-making. In particular, in the case of small M&As, the feedback channel 
described by Kau et al. (2008) and Luo (2005) is especially effective when the stock 
market’s negative assessment of a deal coincides with the reaction to new 
macroeconomic data. This result supports the view that corporate managers can infer 
valuable information from equity markets (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Dye and Sridhar, 
2002), provided that these markets are not experiencing volatility spikes. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology used in our 
empirical analysis; Section 3 describes our datasets and sample statistics; Section 4 
commences with a discussion of results obtained from univariate and multivariate tests 
and then proceeds to a discussion of results of endogeneity tests (that include propensity 
score matching and switching regressions), post-acquisition returns, and results 
referring to the likelihood of deal withdrawal. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
In this section, we discuss our choice of the macro-indicators covered in this paper, 
in addition to the classification of deals based on their size. We present alternative 
approaches to estimating acquirers’ announcement-period and post-acquisition risk-
adjusted returns. We also present methods used to address selection bias concerns with 
regards to the potential endogeneity inherent in the choice of announcing a deal on an 
indicator day. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is used to compare the market’s reaction 
on indicator and non-indicator days based on observable factors. A switching regression 
approach is used to address selection bias due to unobservable factors (discussed in 
Appendix B). Finally, we describe the methods used in estimating any post-acquisition 
drift in an acquirer’s risk-adjusted returns. 
 
2.1. Classification of Indicator days and Small deals 
We examine a large set of macroeconomic announcements. We rely on prior 
literature for guidance on the choice of macro-indicators. For example, Savor and Wilson 
(2013) employ macroeconomic announcements of inflation, employment, and interest 
rates in their analysis. They attribute their choice of these indicators primarily to data 
availability. Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) use a diverse set of macroeconomic 
indicator announcements and find that indicators such as GNP and industrial production 
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have a limited pricing impact. To the best of our knowledge, Chen et al. (2018) provide 
the only scholarly contribution in which a comprehensive set of macroeconomic 
announcements is systematically chosen based on a specific criterion. In particular, they 
choose factors that have significant market influence based on Bloomberg’s Relevance 
Index. They show that announcements of these indicators are associated with a 
significant increase in the level of market attention to corporate announcements. 
Accordingly, we use the same list of influential indicators described by Chen et al. 
(2018). While they do not include the Producer Price Index (PPI) in their analysis, we add 
PPI to the list of indicators used in this study given the evidence presented by Savor and 
Wilson (2013) on the relevance of this factor. Table 1 presents a summary of the 
frequency and source of each macroeconomic indicator used in our analysis. Specifically, 
Table 1 covers the 13 indicators used by Chen et al. (2018), as well as PPI. As can be seen, 
the indicators covered in this paper are: (1) Initial Jobless Claims, (2) Change in Non-farm 
Payrolls, (3) FOMC Rate Decisions, (4) GDP Growth, (5) Consumer Confidence Index, (6) 
ISM Manufacturing Index, (7) Consumer Price Index, (8) University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index, (9) Durable Goods Orders, (10) New Home Sales, (11) 
Housing Starts, (12) Unemployment Rate, (13) Retail Sales, and (14) PPI. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
The dummy variable Indicator Day is assigned a value of one if the day of the deal’s 
announcement coincides with the date of the release of at least one of the 14 
macroeconomic indicators, and zero otherwise (i.e. non-indicator days). 
In classifying deals as small, medium, or large, we consider deals that are in the 
bottom two quintiles in terms of dollar valuation as small, deals in the top two quintiles 
as large, and deals in the middle quintile as medium-sized. Hence, the dummy variable 
Small Deal is assigned a value of one if the deal is in the bottom two quintiles of valuations, 
and zero otherwise. It is important to note that our results remain unchanged if (a) we 
adopt a tercile-based approach by dividing the deal values into three groups of equal size, 
or (b) the threshold between large and small deals is endogenously estimated using the 
Bai and Perron (2003, 1998) approach. Further, our conclusions reported in this paper 
remain unchanged if the deals are sorted based on a scaled measure of the deal value. Our 
results also hold if we scale each deal value by the value of the total share price index for 
the U.S. market. This index is computed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development and is reported on the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis website. This 
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index captures the value of all prices of U.S. traded shares and is standardized at a value 
of 100 for the year 2015. For example, more than 90% of the deals that end up being 
classified as small using the scaled measure also end up in the same size group if the 
unscaled deal value is used as a proxy for the target’s size.6 
 
2.2. Estimation of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns 
We estimate acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns as follows: 
  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) (1) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, is the abnormal return to acquirer 𝑖 at day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the stock return of 
acquirer 𝑖 at day 𝑡, and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is the expected return of acquiring firm 𝑖 at day 𝑡, estimated 
based on the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model (3FF) as in Equation (2) below: 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = (1 − ?̂?𝑖)𝑅𝑓,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝐸(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + ?̂?𝑖
𝑠𝑚𝑏𝐸(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) + ?̂?𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐸(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) (2) 
The parameters ?̂?𝑖, ?̂?𝑖
𝑠𝑚𝑏 , and ?̂?𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑙 are estimated over days 𝑡 − 250 to 𝑡– 20, with 𝑡 = 0 
as the M&A announcement day, as outlined in the Equation (3) below: 
 (𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑖
𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
The announcement period Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for acquirer 𝑖 is 
estimated as the sum of the risk-adjusted returns in the three-day window (𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 +
1) surrounding the M&A announcement day (𝑡 = 0), as outlined in Equation (4) below: 
 




For robustness, in line with numerous studies with similar sample characteristics 
(Alexandridis et al., 2013; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Barbopoulos et al., 2018a, 
2018b; Fuller et al., 2002), the announcement period risk-adjusted returns for acquiring 
firm 𝑖 are estimated using the market-adjusted model (MAM). Results based on CAR 
obtained from 3FF and MAM are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
In our empirical analysis, the announcement period risk-adjusted returns of 
acquirers are examined in univariate tests that analyze M&As announced on indicator 
and non-indicator days on the full sample, as well as sub-samples classified by deal size, 
target firm’s listing status, and the deal’s payment method. This analysis considers 
differences in acquirer CAR between indicator and non-indicator deals, as well as 
differences in CAR between small and large M&As across all sub-samples. 
                                                          




2.3. Determinants of acquirers’ risk-adjusted returns: A multivariate analysis 
We next test for the presence and magnitude of the joint effect of indicator day and 
deal size on acquirers’ CAR in a multivariate framework, controlling for the effects of 
several known factors. Thus, Equation (5) is estimated in a nested regression form: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2Indicator Day𝑖 + 𝛽3Small Deal𝑖
+ 𝛽4(Indicator Day × Small Deal)𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=5
+ ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝜆
+ 𝑖          𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁 
(5) 
where the dependent variable, CAR, is the three-day announcement period cumulative 
abnormal returns of acquirers calculated as in Equation (4). The intercept 𝛽1 accounts for 
the average acquirer CAR in medium and large acquisitions after controlling for the 
effects of the explanatory variables that enter the matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑗 . 𝛽2 accounts for the 
additional wealth effect arising from announcing acquisitions of medium and large deals 
on indicator days. 𝛽3 accounts for the wealth effects arising from acquiring small 
companies relative to medium and large ones. 𝛽4, in turn, represents the difference 
between the acquirer CAR realized from announcing small deals on indicator days and 
the CAR realized by announcing small deals on non-indicator days. If our main prediction 
regarding the impact of market attention holds, then we expect 𝛽4 to reflect significant 
differential acquirer wealth effects. Specifically, given the overwhelming evidence on the 
positive wealth effects of small acquisitions, we expect these effects to be more 
pronounced on indicator days. The explanatory variables in the 𝑋𝑖𝑗 matrix are defined 
and discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Existing literature provides ample evidence on the impact of a deal’s payment 
method on acquirer risk-adjusted returns (Eckbo et al., 2018; Fuller et al., 2002; Travlos, 
1987). To accommodate the effect of the method of payment in our tests we include two 
dummy variables in Equation (5). The first variable Full Stock is assigned a value of one if 
the deal is fully settled in stock, and zero otherwise. The second variable Full Cash is 
assigned a value of one if the deal is fully settled in cash, and zero otherwise. Schwert 
(2000) documents that acquirer risk-adjusted returns in the M&A announcement period 
are negatively related to takeover hostility. To control for the effect of hostile versus 
friendly acquisitions in our tests, a dummy variable is assigned a value of one when the 
deal is hostile, and zero otherwise (i.e. friendly). 
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If both the target and the acquirer belong to the same sector, their integration may 
be easier, and the synergy gains may end up being higher (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 
2012). Firms acquiring targets that operate in an unrelated business may also gain from 
diversification, thereby resulting in a reduction in the volatility of the combined firm’s 
cash flows and the cost of capital. However, Morck et al. (1990) find that returns to 
shareholders of bidding firms are lower when a firm diversifies. To control for the effects 
of corporate diversification in our tests, we use a dummy variable that is assigned a value 
of one for diversifying deals (i.e. target and acquirer do not share the same two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code), and zero otherwise (i.e. focused deals), 
which is included in Equation (5). 
Moeller et al. (2004) demonstrate that acquiring firms’ risk-adjusted returns during 
the announcement period of M&As are affected by their size. They show that 
shareholders of small acquirers enjoy, on average, significantly higher CAR in the short 
run. Therefore, to control for the effect of acquiring firm size in our tests, the natural 
logarithm of the acquirer’s market capitalization 20 days prior to the M&A announcement 
day is included in Equation (5). The listing status of target firms has also been shown, in 
previous studies, to affect acquirer risk-adjusted returns (Chang, 1998; Draper and 
Paudyal, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006). Chang (1998) argues that private target acquisitions 
are more profitable investments for acquirers compared to public target ones, due to 
limited information and competition for private target firms, as well as the more effective 
monitoring offered by targets’ managers/owners in the combined entity during the 
merger integration phase. Adra and Barbopoulos (2019) emphasize the role of liquidity 
considerations in influencing the acquirer CAR in both private and public target deals. 
Fuller et al. (2002) further argue that subsidiary target deals are value-increasing for the 
acquirer due to the significant discount arising from the immediate need for cash by the 
target’s parent firm. To control for the effect of private and subsidiary target acquisitions 
in our tests, two dummy variables taking a value of one when the target is private or 
subsidiary, respectively, and zero otherwise, are included in Equation (5). 
Prior research has shown that an acquiring firm’s valuation can affect its risk-
adjusted returns in the short run (Chemmanur et al., 2009; Moeller and Schlingemann, 
2005). Rau and Vermaelen (1998) have also shown that an acquirer’s risk-adjusted 
returns are sensitive to its market-to-book valuation. Thus, to account for this effect in 
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our analysis, the acquirer’s market-to-book value 20 days prior to the M&A 
announcement day is included in Equation (5). 
In addition to these effects, we control for the degree of economic uncertainty7 using 
the Jurado et al. (2015) index during the calendar month preceding the acquisition 
announcement.8 Moeller et al. (2007) examine the link between the theoretical 
predictions of the diversity of opinion and information asymmetry models in explaining 
acquirer risk-adjusted returns. The authors demonstrate the superiority of sigma as a 
proxy for the information asymmetry of a publicly traded firm and its importance in 
shaping the acquirer risk-adjusted returns. Therefore, to proxy for the extent of the 
acquiring firm’s information asymmetry in our tests, the acquirer’s sigma, measured by 
the standard deviation of the residuals in a market model over the period 𝑡 − 252 and 𝑡 −
6, where 𝑡 = 0 is the M&A announcement day, is included in Equation (5). Finally, to 
account for potential unobserved time-variant characteristics that are related to a given 
year in which an M&A deal is announced, as well as unobserved characteristics specific 
to the target’s primary industrial sector, ‘Year Effects’ (?̃?𝑡) and ‘Industry Effects’ (?̃?𝜆) are 
included in Equation (5). 
 
2.4. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Observational studies differ from experimental ones in that randomization is not 
used to assign the treatment. The lack of explicit random assignment raises concerns as 
to whether selection bias reduces the reliability of the results, or their causal 
interpretation, in both univariate and multiple regression tests. To accommodate such 
concerns, we utilize Propensity Score Matching (PSM) in our analysis. More specifically, 
implementing the PSM method allows for a relatively unbiased causal inference by 
pairing treated deals (small deals announced on indicator days) and control deals (small 
                                                          
7 A growing array of studies investigates the extent to which other policy-uncertainty indices, such as the monetary 
policy uncertainty index developed by Baker et al. (2016) affect merger outcomes (see Adra et al. (2019) for a 
comprehensive review). 
8 The authors use monthly economic series in a system of forecasting equations to estimate the implied forecast errors. 
First, for each month and for each series, a forecast is produced based on the combination of the past values of all the 
series in the dataset by using the diffusion index forecasting method of Stock and Watson (2002). Second, the forecast 
error for each series is constructed as the difference between the actual and the forecasted values. The volatility of the 
forecast error for each series is modelled as a linear function of its own past values, in addition to a stochastic 
component that allows for time-varying volatility. Based on this procedure the measures of uncertainty are computed 
by averaging the individual forecastable components of each series’ volatility. While the authors present 1-, 2-, and 12-
months-ahead levels of macroeconomic uncertainty, only the 12-month measure is used in our empirical analysis. 
Nevertheless, our results remain qualitatively similar to those reported when the uncertainty measures for the 
remaining horizons are used. 
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deals announced on non-indicator days) based on observable pre-treatment 
characteristics, and assessing differences between the two groups in the response 
variable (i.e. the announcement CAR) (see Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Rosenbaum 
(2002)). 
 
2.5. Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns 
The post-acquisition acquirer performance is analyzed based on Buy-and-Hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR). This is one of the most commonly used method of evaluating 
the post-acquisition wealth effects of M&As (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999). 
BHARs are derived as the difference between the buy-and-hold returns of an investor in 
the acquiring company and the buy-and-hold returns of a benchmark portfolio. The 
benchmark portfolio here is the CRSP value-weighted market index for the U.S. Equation 
(6) presents our BHAR estimations: 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑠+𝑇
𝑡=𝑠




Equation (6) calculates the BHAR for a period of up to six months following the month of 
the acquisition announcement. Subsequently, the acquirers’ BHARs are regressed against 
a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework that aims to identify the factors 
influencing acquirer value in the post-merger-announcement period, hence testing the 
extent to which small deals announced on indicator days affect acquirer value after the 
acquisition’s announcement: 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2Indicator Day𝑖 + 𝛽3Small Deal𝑖
+ 𝛽4(Indicator Day × Small Deal)𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=5
+ ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝜆
+ 𝑖          𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁 (7) 
The intercept, 𝛽1, accounts for the average risk-adjusted returns accrued to acquirers’ 
shareholders after accounting for the effects of all the explanatory variables that enter 
the matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑗. 𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 𝛽4 have the same interpretation in the context of BHAR as 
described in Equation (5) for the announcement period CAR. If our main prediction holds 
regarding the impact of market attention during indicator days, then we expect 𝛽3 to 
reflect a positive drift for the acquirers of small targets that announce their deals on non-
indicator days. Furthermore, if the market’s assessment of small deals announced on 
indicator days is accurate, then we expect 𝛽4 to represent a negative effect that, at least 
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partially, offsets the positive drift in 𝛽3. The impact of each of the explanatory variables 
entering the 𝑋𝑖𝑗 matrix is recorded in the vector 𝛽𝑗 . The parameters in this vector reflect 
the impact of factors that have been proposed by previous studies, as well as those 
proposed by this study. 
To ensure that the estimation of BHAR is robust, we adopt an alternative matching-
based approach. To examine whether there is a positive drift in the returns of small deals 
announced on non-indicator days relative to the returns of small deals announced on 
indicator days, we apply the following matching exercise. We match each small deal 
announced on a non-indicator day with one announced on an indicator day. The matching 
is done by choosing the deal with the closest level (less than one standard deviation) of 
acquirer market capitalization and market-to-book value ratio to the treated deal. Then, 
we estimate the BHAR as in Equation (8) below.9 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦
= ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑁𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦,𝑡)
𝑠+𝑇
𝑡=𝑠






3. Sample and stylized facts 
3.1. M&A sample criteria and annual distribution 
Our sample covers domestic M&As of public, private, and subsidiary targets 
announced by U.S. domiciled public companies and recorded by the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) Thomson ONE Database between 1 January 1986 and 31 December 
2016. We limit our analysis to domestic M&As to ensure that both merging firms operate 
within the same institutional framework and economic conditions. The end year of 2016 
is chosen to ensure that we provide a comprehensive analysis of post-acquisition 
performance. Moreover, the following selection criteria are imposed when selecting our 
sample: (a) the deal has a disclosed value of at least $1m; (b) no M&As by the same 
company are announced within three trading days of each other (e.g. the short-run 
window of risk-adjusted returns that is analyzed in this paper); (c) the acquiring firm’s 
pre-acquisition market capitalization and market-to-book value are available from 
Compustat and the acquirer has a market value of at least $1m measured 20 days prior 
                                                          
9 If our empirical prediction that small deals announced on non-indicator days need an extended period to be assessed 
by the market relative to deals announced on indicator days, we expect 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦 to reflect a significant 
positive post-acquisition drift. 
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to the M&A announcement day; (d) the acquirer’s previous stake in the target does not 
exceed 10% of the total share; (e) the acquirer aims to control at least 50% of the target’s 
shares upon deal completion, and (f) acquirer returns are available from CRSP. After 
excluding deals classified as spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, and 
repurchases, we are left with 11,605 M&As that satisfy the above sample selection 
criteria. 
Table 2 presents the annual distribution of our sample according to (a) deal size, 
(b) M&A completion rate, (c) target firm’s listing status, (d) the deal’s timing with respect 
to the release of key macroeconomic indicators, (e) the deal’s payment method, (f) the 
deal’s diversification profile, and (g) the deal’s attitude. As also discussed in Maksimovic 
et al. (2013), the variation in the number of M&As is cyclical, reaching peaks during 
periods of economic expansion (the late 1990s and mid-2000s) and troughs during 
periods of economic contraction (early 2000s and the period following the 2008 financial 
crisis). Most of the deals in our sample involve private target firms (51.96%), while public 
(23.70%) and subsidiary (24.34%) targets represent the rest. Similarly, most of the deals 
in our sample are settled in cash (50.87%), while full-stock (25.34%) and mixed 
(23.79%) payment deals represent the rest. About 6% of deals in our sample are 
withdrawn, which is in line with Kau et al. (2008). Finally, 36.88% of deals in our sample 
are diversifying. At the sector level, unreported statistics (available from the authors 
upon request) show that the largest share of deals is in the high technology sector (40%), 
while the lowest share is in the real estate sector (0.10%). 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
As discussed above, we employ a wide range of firm- and deal-specific variables in 
both our univariate and multivariate tests. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics (i.e., 
averages) of (a) acquirer market capitalization, (b) deal value, (c) relative deal size, (d) 
acquirer market-to-book value, and (e) acquirer sigma for the full sample (Panel A) and 
sub-samples of deals announced on indicator days (Panel B) and non-indicator days 
(Panel C). 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
We find that small deals announced on indicator days exhibit lower MTBV ratios 
relative to deals announced on non-indicator days. Moreover, we find that deals 
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announced on indicator days are in general smaller ($316m vs. $492m), and have smaller 
acquirers ($3,447m vs. $3,811m), than those announced on non-indicator days. Overall, 
the descriptive statistics suggest that deals announced on indicator rather than non-
indicator days are, on average, different in a number of observable characteristics, which 
in turn implies that they are likely to yield significantly different gains to acquirers. As a 
result, we apply both a switching regression analysis and Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) to address self-selection concerns. 
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between all pairs of the independent 
variables used in our analysis. As can be seen, the correlation coefficients are low and 
alleviate concerns regarding multicollinearity issues. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Univariate tests of acquirer risk-adjusted returns 
Results from our univariate tests on acquirer risk-adjusted returns are presented 
in Tables 5 and 6. They are organized by indicator day, deal size, target firm’s listing status 
(Table 5), and deal’s method of payment (Table 6). Consistent with prior studies (Fuller 
et al., 2002), Panel (A) of Table 5 shows that acquirers of private and subsidiary target 
firms enjoy significant gains of about 1.95% and 2.65%, respectively, whereas acquirers 
of public targets experience significant losses of 0.70%. Moreover, Panel (A) of Table 6 
shows that around the M&A announcement day, acquirers enjoy significant gains of about 
1.39% in cash-financed deals, 1.23% in stock-financed deals, and 2.00% in deals financed 
with a combination of cash and stock, which is in line with prior studies, such as Fuller et 
al. (2002) and Faccio and Masulis (2005). 
Importantly, our univariate tests show that acquirers in M&As announced on 
indicator days enjoy on average about 0.45% higher returns compared to those in M&As 
announced on non-indicator days. This difference is significant at the 1% level and 
strongly suggests that acquirers in deals experiencing a higher degree of investor 
scrutiny, which is likely to be on indicator rather than non-indicator days (as in Chen et 
al. (2018) and Savor and Wilson (2013)), enjoy higher gains than acquirers in deals 
announced on non-indicator days. 
Our univariate tests present some other interesting results. First, the positive and 
significant difference in the acquirer CAR between deals announced on indicator versus 
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non-indicator days is driven by small (0.81%) rather than large acquisitions (0.26%). 
Second, small deals announced on indicator days yield higher gains to acquirers (1.28%) 
compared to counterpart deals announced on non-indicator days (0.73%) (Panel E in 
both Tables 5 and 6). Therefore, it is the interaction between indicator days and small 
deal size that yields the highest benefits to acquirers. 
(Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here) 
Additional results reported in Table 5 (Panel B) suggest that acquirers’ CAR from 
small target acquisitions is also shaped by private target deals that are announced on 
indicator days (2.52%) rather than on non-indicator days (1.67%). This finding is 
consistent with our attention-based argument, especially because private companies 
generally operate in an opaque informational environment and have limited investor 
coverage (Officer et al., 2009).10 While the fraction of deals announced on indicator days 
is quite large in the three groups based on deal size, it is worth noting that this fraction 
shrinks as the deals become larger. The difference in the fraction of deals announced on 
indicator days becomes more noticeable when extremely small and extremely large deals 
are compared. In untabulated results, deals below 10 million dollars in valuation have a 
52% probability of being announced on indicator days. By contrast, deals that exceed 1 
billion dollars in valuation have a 44% probability of being announced on indicator days. 
Interestingly, we find the effect of investor attention on indicator days to be more 
pronounced in large public deals. One potential explanation for this result is that the 
complex nature of these deals (Alexandridis et al., 2013) allows acquirers to benefit from 
the reduction in economic uncertainty due to the release of new macroeconomic data. 
In addition, Table 6 shows that the higher acquirer CAR in small deals announced 
on indicator days are mainly driven by deals settled, either fully or partially, using the 
acquirers’ stocks.11 These results hold true after we apply a series of robustness tests that 
include different measures of firm value and classifications of deal size (i.e. number of 
groups), as well as groupings into small, medium, and large based on different cut-off 
                                                          
10 Evidence from multivariate tests (untabulated) shows that the positive wealth effect associated with deals 
announced on indicator days is significant in both private and subsidiary target deals. That is, acquirers in private 
(subsidiary) target acquisitions that are announced on indicator days realize, on average, 0.88% (1.04%) higher CAR 
than counterparts announcing deals on non-indicator days. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this 
analysis. 
11 Cash payments are generally used in deals characterized by limited valuation complexities. In contrast, the use of 
stock is a form of contingent payment in deals associated with significant valuation complexities (Reuer et al., 2004). 
Hence, a possible interpretation of our findings is that deals fully settled in cash are not sensitive to the effect of 
increased market attention, compared to the informationally demanding deals that require the use of a contingent 
payment method, such as stock. 
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levels. Put together, our univariate tests uncover an interesting source of M&A value 
creation which appears to be correlated with both the timing of M&A announcements 
(indicator vs. non-indicator day) and the size of the deal.12 
Table 7 reports further evidence on the direction and magnitude of our estimated 
investor-alertness effect on acquirer CAR shown in Tables 5 and 6. Specifically, we expect 
the economic effects associated with the increased investor alertness to small 
acquisitions to be more pronounced in M&As involving also relatively small acquirers, for 
which such deals are economically consequential. In Table 7, we sort the group of small 
acquisitions into three groups based on the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market value (i.e. 
market valuation at 20 trading days prior to the M&A announcement day). As expected, 
the results reported in this table suggest that the documented wealth effects of the 
increase in investor alertness to small deals on indicator days are exclusively driven by 
deals in which the acquirer is also small, i.e. in the bottom two quintiles of the sub-sample. 
Within this group of deals, the generally small acquisitions are economically meaningful 
for the small acquirers (a relative size of 38%), and the deals announced on indicator days 
realize, on average, 1.50% higher CAR than the deals announced on remaining days. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
4.2. Multivariate tests of acquirer risk-adjusted returns 
In this section, we investigate whether the relationship between the announcement 
of deals on indicator days and acquirer CAR can be explained by other known 
characteristics. Table 8 reports estimates from OLS regressions where the acquirer CAR 
over a three-day window (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 1, where 𝑡 = 0 is the M&A announcement day) is the 
dependent variable across all specifications. Specifications (1) to (3) are applied on the 
full sample, while specification (4) is applied only on small deals, specification (5) only 
on medium-sized deals, and specification (6) only on large deals. Specifications (1) to (6) 
include industry fixed-effects, while time fixed-effects are included in specifications (3) 
to (6). 
The main explanatory variables across all models are (a) a dummy variable 
representing deals announced on indicator days, (b) a dummy representing small deals 
                                                          
12 Additional univariate results based on an alternative scaled measure of deal value, and different cut-off points in 
grouping the deals into small, medium, and large, yield the same conclusions. These results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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(i.e. bottom two quintiles of deal values), and (c) the interaction dummy variable 
representing small deals announced on indicator days (Models (2) and (3)). The main 
control factors across all specifications are the dummy variables representing stock or 
cash financing, a dummy representing the presence of hostile takeovers, a dummy 
representing the presence of diversified deals, the natural logarithm of acquirer market 
value at 20 trading days prior to the M&A announcement day, dummy variables 
representing the presence of private or subsidiary target deals, the acquirer market-to-
book value at 20 trading days prior to the M&A announcement day, the macroeconomic 
uncertainty in the U.S. in the month preceding the M&A announcement as measured by 
Jurado et al. (2015), and finally the acquirer’s sigma, which is measured by the standard 
deviation of the residuals in a market model over the period 𝑡 − 252 and 𝑡 − 6, where 𝑡 =
0 is the M&A announcement day, as in Alexandridis et al. (2008), Moeller et al. (2007) and 
Alexakis and Barbopoulos (2019). 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
Evidence reported in Model (1) is in line with the conclusions drawn from our 
univariate tests. That is, deals announced on indicator days are, on average, associated 
with a 0.45% higher acquirer CAR relative to deals announced on non-indicator days. 
Moreover, the significant wealth effect of the deal’s announcement on indicator days is 
more pronounced in small M&As. Specifically, the coefficient of the interaction variable 
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 ×  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, including the interaction term 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 ×  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦 renders the 
coefficient of 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦 statistically insignificant. Models (2) and (3) suggest that 
small deals announced on indicator days yield on average 0.67% higher acquirer CAR 
relative to both small deals on non-indicator days and large deals overall. Models (4) to 
(6) reinforce our conclusions from univariate tests by showing that the wealth effects 
arising from the choice of an indicator day to make an M&A announcement are 
exclusively driven by small target acquisitions (Model (4)). That is, a small deal 
announced on an indicator day is, on average, associated with 0.81% higher acquirer CAR 
than a small deal announced on a non-indicator day.13 
                                                          
13 In untabulated estimations, we examine the extent to which some indicators are more relevant than others in shaping 
our results. The evidence from this investigation suggests that our results are mainly influenced by unemployment, 
PPI, Durable Goods, and housing market indicators, in addition to leading indicators such as the ISM manufacturing 
index and the consumer confidence indices. The first three indicators have been highlighted in prior studies as 
important sources of stock market movements. The significant effect of the housing-related indicators is somewhat 
expected, especially given the role of the housing market during the 2008 financial crisis. The PMI and consumer 
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Our control variables depict similar effects to those reported in prior studies. 
Travlos (1987) documents that deals involving stock-swaps are associated with more 
negative abnormal returns for acquirers than cash-financed deals. In addition, as 
discussed by Alexandridis et al. (2013), “Controlling for the occurrence of stock-for-stock 
deals is particularly important because large deals are more likely paid for with stock…” 
(p. 10). Interestingly, and consistent with Alexandridis et al. (2013), we find that the 
coefficient of a full-stock indicator is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level 
in Model (6), in which only large deals are used in the test. Stock deals are associated with 
1.00% lower acquirer CAR in specification (6). Moreover, Morck et al. (1990) find that 
returns to shareholders of bidding firms are lower when their firm diversifies, while 
Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) argue that if both target and acquiring firms belong 
to the same industry, their integration may be easier and the synergy gains are higher. 
Consistent with both studies, across Models (1) to (3) we find that acquirers in diversified 
M&As experience significant losses. 
We also include the natural logarithm of the acquirer market value to control for 
the well-known result that small acquirers tend to outperform large ones (Moeller et al., 
2004). Across all specifications, we find strong evidence suggesting that large acquirers 
engaged in M&As destroy value. Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002) show that 
acquirers enjoy significant gains from M&As of private and subsidiary targets and argue 
that this is due to (a) the limited completion for private targets and hence lower price 
offered to the target, (b) liquidity considerations (also in Adra and Barbopoulos (2019)), 
(c) limited information availability about private targets, and (d) the higher discounts 
associated with subsidiary target M&As. Across all specifications, we find that private and 
subsidiary target M&As are associated with significantly higher acquirer CAR relative to 
listed target M&As. 
We also control for the acquirer market valuation at the time of the deal 
announcement. Prior studies show that the acquiring firm’s valuations can affect acquirer 
CAR (Chemmanur et al., 2009; Moeller et al., 2005). As a result, we include the market-to-
book value of the acquirer at 20 trading days prior to the M&A announcement in our 
regressions. We find evidence of significantly higher CAR for high market-to-book 
acquirers around the deal announcement. We also include the macroeconomic 
                                                          
confidence indices, in turn, are classified by practitioners as “leading indicators” as they provide equity investors with 
new expectations about future production and consumption activities (Baumohl, 2008). 
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uncertainty in the month preceding the M&A announcement, as measured by Jurado et 
al. (2015). Its coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level in specifications (1), 
(2), and (6), suggesting that the acquirers of M&As that take place in a highly uncertain 
economic environment are associated with significant losses. Finally, we control for the 
acquirer’s sigma and find that high sigma acquirers enjoy significantly higher CAR when 
engaged in small target M&As. 
In Table 9 we report additional evidence derived from three multivariate 
specifications aiming to identify the direction and magnitude of our estimated investor-
alertness effect on acquirer CAR. In particular, the models are estimated on different sub-
groups on the sample of small target acquisitions only, sorted by acquirer size. Therefore, 
Models (1) to (3) are estimated within the group of small, medium, and large acquirers, 
respectively. As in our prior analysis, we expect the economic effects associated with 
increased investor alertness to small acquisitions to be more pronounced in M&As 
involving relatively small acquirers. The reported evidence in Table 9 is in line with our 
results from our univariate tests reported in Table 7. They show that the positive effects 
of investor alertness on indicator days are shaped by M&As in which the acquirer is also 
small. Specifically, the coefficient associated with timing the deals on indicator days is 
only significant in the group of small acquirers in Model (1). Based on this model, M&As 
announced on indicator days enjoy, on average, 1.50% higher announcement period CAR 
than deals announced on non-indicator days. 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
Overall, our evidence from the multivariate tests support the view that higher 
investor scrutiny of small deals announced on indicator days appears vital in explaining 
acquirer risk-adjusted returns in the M&A market. 
 
4.3. The cost of attention 
Our main finding in this paper is that small M&As announced on indicator days are 
associated with significant acquirer gains. These gains are consistent with the view that 
high level of investor alertness on indicator days allows for a reduction in the valuation 
uncertainty for deals that would otherwise receive limited scrutiny. If such exposure to 
market attention is riskless, we would expect almost all small target acquisitions to be 
announced on indicator days. Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 1, prior studies 
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suggest that the announcement of macroeconomic data can fail to reduce, and might even 
raise, economic uncertainty (Amador and Weill, 2010; Kandel and Zilberfarb, 1999). 
As a result, the greater attention that acquirers of small targets enjoy on indicator 
days may come at the cost of greater exposure to high economic uncertainty, and 
consequently being subject to large uncertainty discounts (Vuolteenaho, 2002 and 
Petkova, 2006). In Table 10, we examine how the wealth effects of announcing deals on 
indicator days vary with the ability of macroeconomic news to reduce economic 
uncertainty. We consider relatively (high) low levels of the Jurado et al. (2015) 
uncertainty index at the end of each calendar month as a reflection of the (in)ability of 
the average macroeconomic indicator to reduce economic uncertainty. Hence, we 
construct the variable High Uncertainty, which is assigned the value of 1 if the value of the 
Jurado et al. (2015) macroeconomic uncertainty index by the end of the deal’s 
announcement month remains considerably high (higher than the 80th percentile in the 
sample), and 0 otherwise. Evidence from Models (1) and (2), estimated on the full sample, 
suggests that the positive wealth effects of deal announcement on indicator days (i.e. 1% 
rise in acquirer CAR) flip sign in periods when the release of macroeconomic data does 
not reduce economic uncertainty (i.e. losses of 0.80%=1.00%-1.80%). These reversed 
effects are more pronounced for small acquirers who experience losses up to 2.00%, as 
suggested in Models (3) and (4) (i.e. losses of 2.00%=2.00%-4.00%). 
Overall, our findings suggest that the increased attention to small acquisitions on 
indicator days can lead to significant acquirer losses in periods when the released 
macroeconomic data fail to effectively reduce economic uncertainty (i.e. economic 
uncertainty at the end of the announcement month remains considerably high). As such 
outcome cannot be known ex-ante, risk-neutral acquirers may limit their exposure to a 
highly attentive market. In the following subsection, we examine whether these findings 
hold after addressing endogeneity concerns. 
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
 
4.4. Robustness: Switching regressions and endogeneity  
In this section, we apply an endogenous switching regression framework (Fang, 
2005; Golubov et al., 2012; Heckman, 1979; Tucker, 2010) to assess the extent to which 
the market’s short-run reaction to a deal’s announcement is influenced by the 
endogenous choice of deal timing. In particular, a significant part of the positive market 
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reaction to small deals announced on indicator days might be attributed to the fact that 
such deals might be more synergetic than small M&As announced on non-indicator days. 
The application of a switching regression approach (which is discussed in Appendix 
B) to the sample of small acquisitions requires the use of an exclusion restriction via 
which one variable significantly influences the choice of deal timing without affecting the 
outcome. Accordingly, we construct a variable that reflects the habitual tendency of firms 
to announce deals on indicator announcement days. The variable Indicator Day Frequency 
represents the number of times an acquiring firm announced a deal on an indicator day 
in the three calendar years prior to the current announcement. To ensure that the effect 
of this variable on the choice of deal timing is driven by announcement habits rather than 
synergies that the acquirer expects from the deal, we build on Golubov et al.'s (2015) 
findings that particular firms are extraordinary acquirers and hence capable of 
generating synergies irrespective of deal characteristics. Therefore, in explaining both 
the choice of deal timing and the acquirer CAR, we control for the acquirer’s synergetic 
abilities, which are represented by the average CAR realized by the acquirer during the 
three calendar years preceding the announcement. 
The evidence from the Probit selection equation in Table 11 (Panel A) suggests that 
the reduction in the acquirer’s size and the increase in its synergetic abilities increases 
the likelihood of announcing the deal on indicator days. We also find that the larger the 
number of previous deals announced by the acquirer on indicator days, the higher the 
likelihood a new deal is announced on such days. Put together, these findings support the 
notion that acquirers who value the exposure to high market attention are aware of the 
alerting impact of macroeconomic announcements. Models (2) and (3) report the 
outcome equations for deals announced on indicator and non-indicator days, 
respectively. These equations are used, after controlling for the inverse Mills ratios 
(discussed in Appendix B) to construct the counterfactual outcomes used in the What-If 
analysis in Panels (C) and (D). The sigmas and correlation levels (rhos) reported in Panel 
(B) are used to construct the inverse Mills ratios discussed in Appendix B. 
Panels (C) and (D) report the outcome of the What-If analysis in cases where the 
Jurado et al. (2015) macroeconomic uncertainty index is below and above the 80th 
percentile, respectively. For deals announced on indicator (non-indicator) days, we 
construct a counterfactual CAR for cases where such deals are announced on non-
indicator (indicator) days, and we estimate the difference in CAR between the 
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counterfactual outcome and the realized CAR. Evidence from Panel (C) is generally 
consistent with the results from our multivariate tests. In particular, when the release of 
new macroeconomic data does not contribute to high uncertainty, acquirers announcing 
small deals on indicator days would have experienced a 0.53% lower announcement 
period CAR had they announced their deals on non-indicator days. Similarly, acquirers in 
small deals announced on non-indicator days could have enjoyed a 0.51% higher CAR had 
their deals been announced on indicator days. 
Evidently, these effects flip sign under the high economic uncertainty regime in 
Panel (D). In particular, when the release of new macroeconomic data contributes to high 
economic uncertainty, acquirers announcing small deals on indicator days would have 
enjoyed a 1.16% higher gains had they announced their deals on non-indicator days. 
Likewise, acquirers who avoid announcing their deals on indicator days seem to realize 
positive gains (0.88%) relative to counterfactual cases in which their deals are 
announced on indicator days. Overall, these results emphasize the robust relation 
between the increased attention that acquirers of small companies receive on indicator 
days and the ability of release of macroeconomic data to reduce economic uncertainty. It 
is also worth noting that, as expected, the wealth effects estimated via the switching 
regression framework are smaller in magnitude than those estimated via the multivariate 
analysis. This difference is partly due to the control for any bias due to unobservable 
factors through the adjustments with the inverse Mills ratios. 
(Insert Table 11 about here) 
 
4.5. Robustness: Propensity score matching 
In this section, we reinforce the findings obtained from both univariate and 
multivariate tests by further addressing the selection bias due to observable factors using 
PSM. Panel A (Table 12) presents the logistic regression model used to estimate the 
propensity scores. This model yields the same inferences as those derived from the Probit 
selection equation in Panel A of Table 11. Based on the estimated propensity scores, we 
apply a caliper matching algorithm via which deals announced on indicator days are 
matched to deals announced on non-indicator days that lie within 0.1 standard deviation 
of the estimated propensity scores. This ensures that deals without matches are dropped 
from the sample. Moreover, this matching approach ensures that the key observable 
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differences are balanced between treated and untreated (control) observations on the 
matched sample. 
(Insert Table 12 about here) 
The estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of 0.82% is 
statistically significant at the 1% level after adjusting the standard errors using the 
method provided by Abadie and Imbens (2008, 2006). This effect is consistent with the 
evidence from our univariate and multivariate tests. To emphasize how the estimated 
wealth effects of the deal timing change with the variation in economic uncertainty, we 
apply the approach advocated by Ho et al. (2007) which consists of estimating a 
parametric regression on the matched sample. In particular, we estimate a regression 
with the same specification as Model (2) (Table 10) and report the coefficients of 
Indicator Day, Indicator Day × High Uncertainty, and High Uncertainty. The overall 
evidence, which is consistent with our prior results, suggests that the benefits of 
increased market attention on indicator days (i.e. 1.10% increase in CAR) are only 
present in periods when macroeconomic announcements are associated with low 
economic uncertainty. By contrast, the failure of macroeconomic data to reduce economic 
uncertainty can lead acquirers to experience significant losses of up to 0.98% in acquirer 
CAR (=1.10%-2.08%). 
Lastly, Panel C (Table 12) shows how the matching exercise successfully balances 
the propensity scores and the key covariates used in our test between the treated and 
control groups.14 
 
4.6. Post-acquisition returns 
We examine the alerting impact of economic indicators on the post-acquisition 
assessment of the deal via the acquirer’s post-acquisition Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHAR). If small deals announced on indicator days receive more accurate 
market scrutiny than equivalent deals announced on non-indicator days, then we should 
expect the latter group to be associated with a significant post-acquisition drift in the 
acquirer's valuation compared to the former. 
                                                          
14 To determine whether the small deals announced on indicator and non-indicator days differ in terms of their effects 
on acquirer gains, an anonymous reviewer suggested that we follow an approach in the spirit of Savor and Lu (2009) 
by examining whether the market responds differently to the withdrawal of deals in both groups. We find no significant 
differences between the market’s reaction to the withdrawal of indicator and non-indicator deals. 
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Table 13 presents the variation in the BHAR for up to six months after the 
acquisition’s announcement.15 While Models (1) and (2) (Panel A) do not highlight a 
significant drift in the acquirer’s BHAR for small deals during the three-month post-
acquisition period, Models (3) and (4) provide strong support for our prediction. In 
particular, small acquisitions announced on non-indicator days experience a significant 
post-acquisition drift of between 3% and 4%, suggesting that equity investors require a 
considerable period of time to assess the synergies of such deals. This drift, however, is 
not present in the case of small deals announced on indicator days. Specifically, the 
negative coefficient associated with 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦 ×  𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 Day offsets the 
positive coefficient associated with 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙. A Wald test of the restriction that the 
coefficient of 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦 ×  𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 is equal to the negative value of the 
coefficient of 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 cannot be rejected (p-value of 0.79). Models (5) and (6) further 
reinforce this result by showing that the difference in post-acquisition returns emerges 
in the period between three and six months following the acquisition’s announcement. 
We also estimate the variation in BHAR up to 12 months after the deal’s announcement, 
with no significant effect of the timing. This suggests that the effect of deal timing on the 
acquirer’s post-acquisition returns is focused in the six-month period following the M&A 
announcement. To conserve space, we do not tabulate the results. 
(Insert Table 13 about here) 
Panel (B) (Table 13) also shows that small deals announced on non-indicator days 
are associated with a positive and significant drift of more than 2% in the acquirer’s post-
acquisition returns relative to comparable small deals announced on indicator days. Put 
together, our results based on the analysis of post-acquisition BHARs validate the 
conclusion that the market’s assessment of small deals announced on indicator days is 
more complete than that of small deals announced on non-indicator days. 
 
4.7. Is the withdrawal rate of small acquisitions affected by the market’s feedback? 
Evidence suggests that the market’s feedback to a deal’s announcement 
significantly affects the likelihood of deal completion (Kau et al., 2008; Luo, 2005). In this 
section, we examine how the market’s assessment of small M&As on indicator and non-
                                                          
15 There are 87 deals in which we do not find delisting returns in CRSP. We adopt two approaches: (a) we exclude these 
deals from the sample, and (b) we keep these deals in the sample and assign a return of -30% for the acquirer in line 
with the results presented by Shumway (1997). In both (a) and (b), our key findings suggest that small deals announced 
on indicator days experience smaller post-acquisition drifts than small deals announced on non-indicator days. 
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indicator days affects the rate of deal completion. In particular, we examine the extent to 
which acquirers of small companies respond to negative abnormal returns around the 
deal’s announcement, and how this response differs between deals announced on 
indicator vs. non-indicator days. Results reported in Table 14 uncover how the likelihood 
of deal completion (withdrawal) changes with the announcement period CAR. For deals 
announced on indicator and non-indicator days, we present the number of withdrawn 
and completed deals, depending on the market’s assessment and deal size. The 
withdrawal rates reported in Table 14 range between 3% and 12%, and are similar to the 
rates reported by Kau et al. (2008). 
First, we find that the likelihood of deal withdrawal is considerably higher for large 
acquisitions than for small ones. This difference holds across all withdrawn deals (8.4%, 
Panel A). For example, while more than 12% of the large deals that receive a large 
negative and significant market response (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  <  −3%) are unsuccessful (all deals, 
Panel D), only 4% of the small deals receiving a similar market reaction are withdrawn 
(small deals, Panels B). Hence, acquirers seem to proceed with small acquisitions, despite 
any negative market feedback. 
Second, and interestingly, despite the general tendency of small target acquirers to 
complete their deals, Panel B (Table 14) shows that small deals receiving an extreme 
negative market reaction around indicator announcement days are almost twice as likely 
to be withdrawn relative to small deals that receive a similar market response on non-
indicator days (5.7% vs. 2.8% withdrawal rates). Therefore, small deals that receive a 
negative market reaction around non-indicator days have a lower probability of 
withdrawal (2.8%) than any other group in Table 14. 
(Insert Table 14 about here) 
To shed further light of the impact of the market’s reaction on the likelihood of a 
deal’s completion, Table 15 presents findings from three logistic regression models 
estimated on the sample of small, medium, and large acquisitions, respectively. In all 
models, we introduce a dummy variable, labelled as Negative Market Feedback, which is 
assigned a value of one if the announcement period CAR is below −3%. We also introduce 
the interaction of this variable with Indicator Day. Evidence from Model (1) suggests that 
small-target acquirers experiencing a significant negative market feedback around the 
deal’s announcement on indicator days are more likely to complete, rather than 
withdraw, the deal. One potential explanation for this result is that these acquirers do not 
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consider the adverse market reaction to be an accurate assessment of their deal’s 
potentials. Accordingly, they become more incentivized to complete the deal and recover 
the temporary announcement period losses once the market fully assesses the deal’s 
synergy prospects. In line with our findings in Table 14, negative market feedback to 
small target deals on indicator days (Model (1)) is associated with a higher likelihood of 
deal withdrawal than negative market feedback on non-indicator days. By contrast, 
Models (2) and (3) do not show similar effects in the case of medium and large 
acquisitions. Put together, these results reinforce the view that acquirers have a stronger 
propensity to “listen” to the market’s feedback on indicator days compared to non-
indicator ones. 
(Insert Table 15 about here) 
 
4.8. Do volatility spikes limit the effectiveness of the market’s feedback? 
The final step in our analysis consists of examining whether the withdrawal or 
cancellation channel discussed in Section 4.7 ceases to operate in the presence of excess 
volatility. In part, processing the causes of the market’s negative feedback to an M&A 
announcement may not necessarily be a straightforward task for the acquirer’s 
managers. This is especially relevant to cases when the negative feedback coincides with 
a highly volatile market whereby it becomes difficult to disentangle the rational pricing 
from noise or sentiment-driven trading (Audrino et al., 2019; Bender et al., 2013; Brown, 
1999; Lee et al., 2002). This distracting effect is expected to be stronger on indicator days 
as macroeconomic announcements tend to attract noise traders (see Hautsch et al., 
2011). 
To test these effects, we introduce the dummy variable High Cumulative VXO to 
our analysis, which is assigned the value of 1 if the cumulative three-day returns of the 
VXO index (which captures the implied volatility in the S&P 100 options) exceeds the 80th 
percentile in the sample, and 0 otherwise. Model (1) (Table 16) suggests that the 
increased volatility at the time of the deal announcement around indicator days results 
in acquirers being reluctant to cancel small deals that receive negative market feedback.16 
This finding suggests that acquirers do not put unlimited trust in the market’s feedback 
on indicator days, especially when the release of economic indicators triggers significant 
                                                          
16 As predicted, these effects are not relevant for the less informationally demanding medium- and large-sized deals in 
Models (2) and (3), respectively. 
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rises in overall market volatility. Overall, these results show that acquirers are generally 
aware of both the opportunities and the challenges arising from the increased market 
attention on indicator days. 
(Insert Table 16 about here) 
 
5. Conclusions 
We investigate the effect of the release of macroeconomic news on specific days, 
defined as “indicator days”, on acquirers’ shareholder gains both around and after the 
acquisition announcement. We argue that equity investors are highly alert on indicator 
days relative to non-indicator ones, which allows for a more accurate assessment of the 
acquisition synergies involving small targets in particular, which are otherwise subject to 
limited market scrutiny. Emphasizing the alerting role of indicator days, we find that 
acquirers of small targets are more likely to announce their acquisitions on indicator 
rather than non-indicator days. 
Our main univariate and multivariate tests show that small M&As announced on 
indicator days realize higher announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
compared to counterparts announced on non-indicator days. We find these effects to be 
concentrated in cases where the acquirer is also considerably small (i.e. high relative deal 
size), and hence generally subject to limited market attention. Moreover, we show that 
the increased attention on indicator days does not necessarily guarantee positive gains 
for acquirers, especially as the inability of macroeconomic news to reduce economic 
uncertainty can erode most of the acquirer’s attention-driven gains and even turn them 
to losses. The results hold after addressing self-selection bias concerns and remain strong 
after we apply a series of robustness tests, including different measures of firm value and 
classifications of deal size. Our tests further show that acquirers of small targets who 
announce deals on indicator days experience a relatively small post-acquisition drift. 
Finally, we find that, under moderate variation in volatility, small target acquirers that 
announce their deals on indicator days are more likely to “listen” to the market’s 
feedback, and hence are more likely to withdraw deals that are adversely perceived by 
the market on indicator days. 
Overall, acquirers appear to understand the alerting role of macroeconomic news. 
As proposed by Hayek (1945), Dye and Sridhar (2002), and Bond et al. (2012), stock 
markets can be a source of relevant information for corporate executives about the 
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potential of their own firms. However, as our M&A-based evidence shows, this relevant 
informative mechanism is trustworthy only when markets are highly attentive and 
subject to moderate levels of volatility. Further research on the alerting impact of the 
release of macro-indicator news is required to test its effect on corporate investment in 





Definition of variables 
Variable Description Source 
Acquirer Market Value  
Acquirer’s market value of equity at 20 trading days prior to the 




The market value of the acquirer at 20 trading days prior to the M&A 
announcement day, divided by its book-value of equity from the 




The acquirer’s 3-day (−1, +1) announcement period cumulative 
abnormal returns, estimated using Equation (4). 
CRSP 
BHAR3 












Dummy=1 if the acquirer and the target have different two-digit SIC 
codes, and 0 otherwise (Focused Deal). 
SDC 
Full Stock 
Dummy=1 if 100% of the deal consideration is financed with stock, 
and 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
% Stock The percentage of the deal value that is financed with stock. SDC 
Mixed 
Dummy=1 if the deal includes a mix of cash and stock financing, and 
0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Negative Market Feedback Dummy=1 if 𝐶𝐴𝑅 < −3%, and 0 otherwise. Compustat 
Deal Value 




The deal value divided by the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market 
value. 
SDC 
Public Dummy=1 if the target is a public firm, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Hostile 
Dummy=1 if the deal is classified as hostile, and 0 otherwise 
[Friendly or Neutral]. 
 
Private Dummy=1 if the target is a private firm, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Withdrawn Dummy=1 if the deal is withdrawn, and 0 otherwise [Completed]. SDC 
Subsidiary Dummy=1 if the target is a divested subsidiary, and 0 otherwise. SDC 
Small Deal 
Dummy=1 if the deal value is in the bottom two quintiles of the 
distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Medium Deal 
Dummy=1 if the deal value is in the middle quintile of the 
distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Large Deal 
Dummy=1 if the deal value is in the top two quintiles of the 
distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Indicator Day 
Dummy=1 if the day during which the deal is announced also 
includes the release of an influential macroeconomic indicator, and 




The value of the Jurado et al. (2015) macroeconomic uncertainty 






 The standard deviation of the residuals in a market model over the 
period 𝑡 − 252 and 𝑡 − 6, where 𝑡 = 0 is the M&A announcement 
day. 
Compustat 
High Cumulative VXO 
Dummy=1 if the 3-day sum of the daily returns on the VXO index 
around the time of the deal announcement exceeds the 80th 
percentile in the sample, and 0 otherwise. 
Bloomberg 
High Uncertainty 
Dummy=1 if the value of the Jurado et al. (2015) macroeconomic 
uncertainty index in the month of the bid announcement exceeds 





Indicator Day Frequency 
The number of deals announced by the acquirer on indicator days 




The average CAR of the acquirer for the deals announced in the 3 
calendar years preceding the deal’s announcement. If no deals are 






Addressing Endogeneity: A Switching Regression Approach 
The regressions reported in Table (8) can be presented using the following specification: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝛾𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 (B.1) 
where 𝑋𝑖
′ is the vector covering firm- and deal-specific characteristics. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 is 
the main treatment variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is announced at the time 
of the release of influential macroeconomic indicators, and 0 otherwise. 𝜇𝑖 is a white noise 
error term. The treatment variable, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖, might not be exogenous, which raises 
concerns about the consistency of our estimates that are based on the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression. Assuming 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 is endogenously determined, the 
choice of deal timing can be presented by the binary response model: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 = 𝑍𝑖
′𝛿 + 𝑖 (B.2) 
where 𝑍𝑖
′ is a vector of the factors that influence the choice of deal announcement timing 
and 𝑖 as an error term. This model can be estimated using a Probit regression. The binary 
choice of the deal announcement day can be modelled as: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 = 1  𝑖𝑓𝑓  𝑍𝑖
′𝛿 + 𝑖 > 0 (B.3) 
and 
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 = 0  𝑖𝑓𝑓  𝑍𝑖
′𝛿 + 𝑖 ≤ 0 (B.4) 
with the assumption that 𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖 are uncorrelated. Building on the original contribution 
of Heckman (1979), a rich body of empirical research generalizes this framework to allow 
for switching regressions with endogenous switching. In the context of our analysis, the 
following two outcomes equations: 
 𝑦1𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽1 + 𝜇1𝑖 (B.5) 
 𝑦2𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽2 + 𝜇2𝑖  (B.6) 
can be presented. Equation (B.5) presents the variation in the acquirer CAR for the deals 
announced on indicator days. Equation (B.6), in turn, presents the variation in the 
acquirer CAR for deals announced during other days. It is worth noting that, in 
observational studies, the researcher observes only one of the outcomes. In particular, 
for a deal announced on an indicator day, it is impossible to observe the counterfactual 
case in which this deal is announced on a non-indicator day. Thus: 
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 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦1𝑖  𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 = 1  (B.7) 
and 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦2𝑖   𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 = 0  (B.8) 
The endogeneity is modelled by allowing the unobserved determinants of the choice of 
deal timing to influence the outcome variable (CAR). Hence, we allow for the presence of 
correlations between 𝑖 and 𝜇1𝑖 (𝜇2𝑖), which leads to the following non-diagonal matrix: 
 






The counterfactual outcome can be estimated as: 
 𝐸[𝑦2𝑖|𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑋𝑖
′𝛽2 + 𝜇2𝑖|𝑍𝑖
′𝛿 + 𝑖 > 0] = 𝐸[𝑋𝑖












 is known as the inverse Mills ratio. The What-If analysis consists of 
estimating the difference between the counterfactual and realized outcomes as 
 𝐸[𝑦2𝑖|𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖 = 1] − 𝑦1𝑖  (B.11) 
and estimating its significance.17 
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Table 1 Description of macroeconomic indicators 
 
Indicator Announcement Time Source 
Initial Jobless Claims Each Thursday U.S. Employment and Training 
Administration 
Change in Non-farm Payrolls First Friday of the month Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Department of Labor 
FOMC Rate Decision Six to eight regularly scheduled 
meetings per year 
Federal Reserves 
GDP Growth Around the 27th of January, April, 
and July, in addition to preliminary 
reports 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Consumer Confidence Index Around the 25th of the month The Conference Board 
ISM Manufacturing Index First business day of the month Institute for Supply Management 
Consumer Price Index Around the 16th of the month Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Department of Labor 
University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index 
Second and fourth Friday (revised) 
of the month 
University of Michigan 
Durable Goods Orders Around the 26th of the month U.S. Census Bureau 
New Home Sales The 17th workday of the month U.S. Department of Commerce 
Housing starts Two or three weeks after the 
reporting month 
U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 
Unemployment Rate First Friday of the month Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Department of Labor 
Retail Sales Around the 12th of the month U.S. Census Bureau 
Producer Price Index Two to three weeks after the 
reporting month 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Department of Labor 
 
The table describes the macroeconomic indicators used in this paper. For each indicator, we present a brief 
description of the reporting frequency and the organization responsible for its release. The sample of 




Table 2 Annual distribution of the sample 
 
Year All Small Medium Large Withdrawn Private Public Subsidiary Indicator Day Full Cash Full Stock Mixed Diversified Friendly 
1986 132 32 30 70 20 44 62 26 65 82 35 15 48 124 
1987 152 53 30 69 22 49 76 27 82 88 40 24 70 149 
1988 147 37 40 70 27 29 83 35 85 97 26 24 60 139 
1989 237 107 54 76 33 84 85 68 118 118 82 37 96 232 
1990 183 99 37 47 28 71 55 57 90 95 56 32 77 179 
1991 215 138 27 50 23 94 58 63 120 84 79 52 76 215 
1992 345 203 53 89 34 183 75 87 175 141 134 70 125 343 
1993 464 261 77 126 34 240 99 125 223 200 167 97 169 462 
1994 604 339 113 152 43 332 142 130 327 259 201 144 228 600 
1995 643 307 132 204 38 324 167 152 309 282 233 128 229 639 
1996 692 357 134 201 40 403 137 152 318 261 272 159 279 687 
1997 932 423 190 319 58 503 202 227 445 364 334 234 378 924 
1998 793 360 166 267 50 449 188 156 349 308 269 216 316 791 
1999 677 278 146 253 37 388 168 121 327 251 256 170 261 675 
2000 532 230 99 203 36 326 121 85 243 157 227 148 205 532 
2001 270 106 59 105 19 121 81 68 123 97 88 85 106 270 
2002 228 94 57 77 14 122 37 69 110 125 37 66 77 228 
2003 189 73 40 76 8 90 49 50 80 80 38 71 62 188 
2004 278 91 74 113 10 149 65 64 148 165 38 75 88 277 
2005 372 127 101 144 8 202 67 103 213 238 36 98 126 372 
2006 401 121 95 185 8 223 66 112 225 278 21 102 164 400 
2007 413 137 75 201 25 231 89 93 236 272 33 108 140 413 
2008 337 100 74 163 33 180 64 93 182 235 25 77 125 336 
2009 221 81 47 93 16 100 61 60 119 144 33 44 68 221 
2010 255 60 49 146 12 120 55 80 145 200 15 40 86 254 
2011 259 62 66 131 11 140 51 68 132 191 20 48 84 258 
2012 283 71 60 152 7 139 60 84 137 193 23 67 89 283 
2013 244 70 44 130 3 124 49 71 119 165 27 52 69 244 
2014 387 82 67 238 14 224 75 88 207 231 44 112 113 386 
2015 399 88 72 239 11 200 88 111 200 269 29 101 146 399 
2016 321 50 60 211 5 146 75 100 189 233 23 65 120 321 
N 11,605 4,637 2,368 4,600 727 6,030 2,750 2,825 5,841 5,903 2,941 2,761 4,280 11,541 
% 100.00 39.96 20.40 39.64 6.26 51.96 23.70 24.34 50.33 50.87 25.34 23.79 36.88 99.45 
 
The table presents the annual distribution of our sample that consists of domestic M&As announced by U.S. domiciled publicly listed acquirers between 1 January 1986 
and 31 December 2016. The annual distribution of the sample depicts the sum of the annual M&A activity. Small is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal 
value is in the bottom two quintiles of the distribution, and 0 otherwise; Large is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal value is in the top two quintiles of 
the distribution, and 0 otherwise; Medium is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal value is in the middle 20% of the frequency distribution, and 0 otherwise; 
Withdrawn is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is unsuccessful, and 0 otherwise [Completed]; Private is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the 
target is a private firm, and 0 otherwise; Public is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the target is a public firm, and 0 otherwise; Subsidiary is a dummy variable 
assigned the value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, and 0 otherwise; Indicator Day refers to the timing of the deal’s announcement (i.e. whether it is announced on an 
indicator day in which at least one key macroeconomic indicator is released); Full Cash is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is fully settled in cash, and 0 
otherwise; Full Stock is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is fully settled in stock, and 0 otherwise; Mixed is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if 
the deal is fully settled with a mix of cash and stock, and 0 otherwise; Diversified is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the acquirer and the target do not share the 












































Group Panel A: All Deals Panel B: Deals Announced on Indicator Days Panel B: Deals Announced on Non-Indicator Days 
All 11,605 3,628 403 0.34 3.23 3.16 5,841 3,447 316 0.35 3.18 3.08 5,764 3,811 492 0.33 3.28 3.25 
Small 4,637 628 8 0.18 3.24 3.58 2,404 644 8 0.18 3.15 3.51 2,233 611 8 0.17 3.33 3.65 
Medium 2,368 1,450 32 0.28 3.18 3.05 1,216 1,535 32 0.27 3.14 3.02 1,152 1,362 32 0.29 3.21 3.07 
Large 4,600 7,772 992 0.53 3.25 2.80 2,221 7,527 804 0.57 3.23 2.64 2,379 8,001 1,168 0.50 3.27 2.95 
Successful 10,881 3,692 344 0.29 3.25 3.15 5,467 3,517 286 0.29 3.20 3.06 5,414 3,869 403 0.28 3.31 3.23 
Withdrawn 724 2,662 1,291 1.08 2.90 3.40 374 2,422 755 1.12 2.87 3.29 350 2,919 1,863 1.05 2.93 3.51 
Private 5,971 2,166 76 0.26 3.55 3.33 3,056 1,987 80 0.27 3.48 3.32 2,915 2,353 73 0.26 3.62 3.33 
Public 2,750 6,992 1,275 0.49 2.90 3.14 1,327 6,858 933 0.51 2.84 2.79 1,423 7,116 1,593 0.47 2.96 3.46 
Subsidiary 2,884 3,446 248 0.35 2.88 2.84 1,458 3,400 248 0.37 2.86 2.83 1,426 3,492 248 0.33 2.91 2.86 
Full Cash 5,903 5,031 254 0.23 2.81 2.78 3,040 4,816 228 0.24 2.79 2.71 2,863 5,260 282 0.22 2.83 2.86 
Full Stock 2,941 2,340 525 0.44 4.09 3.66 1,403 2,002 327 0.45 4.01 3.63 1,538 2,648 706 0.43 4.17 3.69 
Mixed 2,761 1,999 591 0.46 3.21 3.44 1,398 1,919 495 0.46 3.19 3.31 1,363 2,080 689 0.46 3.23 3.57 
Focused 7,325 3,686 472 0.30 3.24 3.05 3,670 3,547 391 0.31 3.21 2.98 3,655 3,825 555 0.30 3.27 3.12 
Diversifying 4,280 3,528 284 0.40 3.22 3.35 2,171 3,277 189 0.41 3.13 3.23 2,109 3,787 382 0.39 3.30 3.47 
Friendly 11,541 3,636 396 0.33 3.23 3.17 5,807 3,461 312 0.34 3.19 3.08 5,734 3,813 482 0.33 3.29 3.25 
Hostile 64 2,133 1,658 1.45 2.60 2.34 34 1,034 1,036 1.67 2.27 2.50 30 3,377 2,364 1.21 2.97 2.16 
 
The table presents the mean levels of the key continuous independent variables used in this paper across the full sample (Panel A), the deals announced on indicator days (Panel B), and the deals announced on non-
indicator days (Panel C). N refers to the number of deals within each group; Acquirer Market Value within each group refers to the acquirer market value of equity 20 trading days prior to the M&A announcement day; 
Deal Value within each group refers to the transaction value in millions of dollars, as reported by SDC; Relative Size within each group refers to the deal’s relative size; Acquirer Market to Book within each group refers to 
the acquirer market-to-book ratio, which is the acquirer’s market value of equity at 20 trading days prior to the M&A announcement day divided by the book-value of equity from the most recent financial statement 
before the acquisition; Acquirer Sigma within each group refers to the acquirer’s Sigma, which is the standard deviation of the residuals in a market model over the period 𝑡 − 252 to 𝑡 − 6, where 𝑡 = 0 is the M&A 
announcement day; Small is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal value is in the bottom two quintiles of the distribution, and 0 otherwise; Large is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal value 
is in the top two quintiles of the distribution, and 0 otherwise; Medium is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal value is in the middle 20% of the frequency distribution, and 0 otherwise; Successful is a 
dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is completed, and 0 otherwise [Withdrawn]; Private is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the target is a private firm, and 0 otherwise; Public is a dummy variable 
assigned the value of 1 if the target is a public firm, and 0 otherwise; Subsidiary is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, and 0 otherwise; Full Cash is a dummy variable assigned the value 
of 1 if the deal is fully settled in cash, and 0 otherwise; Full Stock is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is fully settled in stock, and 0 otherwise; Mixed is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the 
deal is fully settled with a mix of cash and stock, and 0 otherwise; Diversified is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the acquirer and the target do not share the same two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise [Focused]; 




Table 4 Correlation matrix 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Acquirer Market Value (1) 1 
 
                 
Deal Value (2) 0.37 1                                 
Relative Size (3) -0.04 0.05 1                 
Acquirer Market-to-Book (4) 0.02 0.00 -0.05 1                              
Acquirer Sigma (5) -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.06 1                            
Macroeconomic Uncertainty (6) 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.04 1                          
Indicator Day (7) -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 1                        
Small (8) -0.14 -0.10 -0.12 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.02 1                      
Medium (9) -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.41 1                    
Large (10) 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.66 -0.41 1                  
Successful (11) 0.01 -0.07 -0.17 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.08 1                
Private (12) -0.09 -0.10 -0.07 0.11 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.23 0.07 -0.29 0.13 1              
Public (13) 0.11 0.14 0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.24 -0.07 0.30 -0.21 -0.58 1            
Subsidiary (14) -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.59 -0.32 1          
Full Cash (15) 0.08 -0.05 -0.10 -0.14 -0.07 0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.10 -0.15 0.27 1        
Full Stock (16) -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.05 -0.10 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.18 -0.21 -0.59 1      
Mixed  (17) -0.05 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 -0.57 -0.33 1    
Diversified (18) 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 1  
Hostile (19) -0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.06 -0.20 -0.08 0.13 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 1 
 
The table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the following independent variables used in our analysis: Acquirer Market Value is the market value of the acquirer’s equity at 20 trading days prior to the 
M&A announcement day; Deal Value is the value of the transaction, in millions of dollars, as reported by SDC; Relative Size represents the relative size of the transaction to the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market valuation; 
Acquirer Market-to-Book ratio is the acquirer’s market value of equity at 20 trading days prior to the M&A announcement day divided by the book-value of equity from the most recent financial statement before the 
acquisition; Acquirer Sigma is the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model over the period 𝑡 − 252 to 𝑡 − 6, where 𝑡 = 0 is the M&A announcement day; Macroeconomic Uncertainty is the value of the 
Jurado et al. (2015) macroeconomic uncertainty index in the month preceding the acquisition announcement; Indicator Day is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is announced on a day when 
macroeconomic indicators, as reported in Table 1, are announced, and 0 otherwise; Small is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal value is in the bottom two quintiles of the distribution, and 0 otherwise; 
Large is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal value is in the top two quintiles of the distribution, and 0 otherwise; Medium is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal value is in the middle 20% 
of the frequency distribution, and 0 otherwise; Successful is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is completed, and 0 otherwise [Withdrawn]; Private is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the target 
is a private firm, and 0 otherwise; Public is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the target is a public firm, and 0 otherwise; Subsidiary is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, and 0 
otherwise. Full Cash is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is fully settled in cash, and 0 otherwise; Full Stock is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is fully settled in stock, and 0 otherwise; 
Mixed is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is fully settled with a mix of cash and stock, and 0 otherwise; Diversified is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the acquirer and the target do not share 
the same two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise [Focused]; Hostile is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the deal is classified by SDC as hostile, and 0 otherwise [Friendly]. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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(1) – (2) 
% of Deals on 
Indicator Days 
Panel A: All Deals 
All deals 
Mean 1.49*** 1.72*** 1.27*** 0.45*** 50.33% 
N 11,605 5,841 5,764   
Private 
Mean 1.95*** 2.16*** 1.74*** 0.42* 51.16% 
N 6,030 3,085 2,945   
Public 
Mean -0.70*** -0.36* -1.01*** 0.65** 48.25% 
N 2,750 1,327 1,423   
Subsidiary 
Mean 2.65*** 2.70*** 2.60*** 0.09 50.58% 
N 2,825 1,429 1,396   
Panel B: Small Deals (Bottom two quintiles) 
All deals 
Mean 2.05*** 2.44*** 1.64*** 0.81*** 51.84% 
N 4,637 2,404 2,233   
Private 
Mean 2.11*** 2.52*** 1.67*** 0.85*** 51.84% 
N 3,075 1,594 1,481   
Public 
Mean 0.95*** 1.19** 0.69 0.50 51.07% 
N 513 262 251   
Subsidiary 
Mean 2.43*** 2.81*** 2.01*** 0.80 52.24% 
N 1,049 548 501   
Panel C: Medium Deals (Middle quintile) 
All deals 
Mean 1.30*** 1.29*** 1.30*** -0.01 51.35% 
N 2,368 1,216 1,152   
Private 
Mean 1.41*** 1.42*** 1.40*** 0.02 51.97% 
N 1,399 727 672   
Public 
Mean -0.38 -0.33 -0.43 0.10 51.54% 
N 423 218 205   
Subsidiary 
Mean 2.29*** 2.24*** 2.34*** -0.11 49.63% 
N 546 271 275   
Panel D: Large Deals (Top two quintiles) 
All deals Mean 1.03*** 1.17*** 0.91*** 0.26 48.28% 
N 4,600 2,221 2,379   
Private Mean 2.12*** 2.10*** 2.14*** -0.04 49.10% 
N 1,556 764 792   
Public Mean -1.24*** -0.85*** -1.57*** 0.72** 46.69% 
N 1,814 847 967   
Subsidiary Mean 3.00*** 2.80*** 3.20*** -0.40 49.59% 
N 1,230 610 620   
Panel E: Differentials – Small (Panel B) minus Large (Panel D) 
All Mean 1.02*** 1.28*** 0.73***  
Private Mean -0.01 0.42 -0.47 
Public Mean 2.18*** 2.04*** 2.26*** 
Subsidiary Mean -0.57* 0.02 -1.19** 
 
The table presents the univariate analysis of the acquirer’s 3-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for the 
sub-groups of acquisitions defined by the deal’s size and the target’s listing status (private, public, and 
subsidiary). For each group, we report the mean CAR for deals whose announcement coincides with the release 
of a macroeconomic indicator (Indicator Deals) and for deals whose announcement does not coincide with the 
release of macroeconomic indicators (No Indicator Deals). We also report the number of observations in each 
group, the difference between the mean acquirer CAR in indicator deals and non-indicator ones, and the 
percentage of indicator deals. Panel A applies the univariate analysis for the overall sample, while Panels B, C, 
and D apply this analysis on the group of small, medium, and large deals, respectively. In Panel E, we report the 
difference in each group between the acquirer’s CAR in small deals and the acquirer’s CAR in large deals. We 
also report the difference in the percentage of indicator deals. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
















(1) – (2) 
% of Deals on 
Indicator Days 
Panel A: All Deals 
All deals 
Mean 1.49*** 1.72*** 1.27*** 0.45*** 50.33% 
N 11,605 5,841 5,764   
Full Cash 
Mean 1.39*** 1.37*** 1.40*** -0.04 51.50% 
N 5,903 3,040 2,863   
Full Stock 
Mean 1.23*** 1.89*** 0.64** 1.25*** 47.70% 
N 2,941 1,403 1,538   
Mixed 
Mean 2.00*** 2.31*** 1.69*** 0.62* 50.63% 
N 2,761 1,398 1,363   
Panel B: Small Deals (Bottom two quintiles) 
All deals 
Mean 2.05*** 2.44*** 1.64*** 0.81*** 51.84% 
N 4,637 2,404 2,233   
Full Cash 
Mean 1.32*** 1.47*** 1.14*** 0.33 53.96% 
N 2,324 1,254 1,070   
Full Stock 
Mean 2.87*** 3.82*** 2.02*** 1.80*** 47.17% 
N 1,202 567 635   
Mixed 
Mean 2.72*** 3.19*** 2.19*** 1.01* 52.48% 
N 1,111 583 528   
Panel C: Medium Deals (Middle quintile) 
All deals 
Mean 1.30*** 1.29*** 1.30*** -0.01 51.35% 
N 2,368 1,216 1,152   
Full Cash 
Mean 1.08*** 1.02*** 1.16*** -0.14 51.83% 
N 1,229 637 592   
Full Stock 
Mean 0.96** 0.91* 1.01* -0.09 50.92% 
N 595 303 292   
Mixed 
Mean 2.14*** 2.33*** 1.94*** 0.39 50.74% 
N 544 276 268   
Panel D: Large Deals (Top two quintiles) 
All deals 
Mean 1.03*** 1.17*** 0.91*** 0.26 48.28% 
N 4,600 2,221 2,379   
Full Cash 
Mean 1.61*** 1.45*** 1.77*** -0.32 48.89% 
N 2,350 1,149 1201   
Full Stock 
Mean -0.34 0.38 -0.98** 1.36** 46.59% 
N 1,144 533 611   
Mixed 
Mean 1.22*** 1.34*** 1.11*** 0.23 48.73% 
N 1,106 539 567   
Panel E: Differentials – Small (Panel B) minus Large (Panel D) 
All Mean 1.02*** 1.28*** 0.73***   
Full Cash Mean -0.29 0.02 -0.63**   
Full Stock Mean 3.21*** 3.44*** 3.00***   
Mixed Mean 1.49*** 1.85*** 1.07*   
 
The table presents the univariate analysis of the acquirer’s 3-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for the 
sub-groups of acquisitions defined by the deal’s size and the deal’s payment method (cash, stock, or mixed). 
For each group, we report the mean CAR for deals whose announcement coincides with the release of a 
macroeconomic indicator (Indicator Deals) and for deals whose announcement does not with the release of 
macroeconomic indicators (No Indicator Deals). We also report the number of observations in each group, the 
difference between the mean acquirer CAR in indicator deals and non-indicator ones, and the percentage of 
indicator deals. Panel A applies the univariate analysis for the overall sample, while Panels B, C, and D apply 
this analysis on the group of small, medium, and large deals, respectively. In Panel E, we report the difference 
in each group between the acquirer’s CAR in small deals and the acquirer’s CAR in large deals. We also report 





























Mean 3.51*** 4.25*** 2.71*** 1.54*** 0.38 51.89% 
N 1,856 963 803    
Medium 
Acquirers 
Mean 1.76*** 2.14*** 1.36*** 0.78 0.08 51.79% 
N 925 479 446    
Large 
Acquirers 
Mean 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.70*** 0.10 0.03 51.83% 
N 1,856 962 894    
 
The table presents the univariate analysis of the acquirer CAR within the group of small acquisitions across 
different sub-groups determined by the market valuation of the acquiring firm. Within the group of small deals, 
we sort acquirers into three groups based on their pre-acquisition equity market valuation. Small (Large) 
acquirers are those classified in the bottom (top) two quintiles of market valuations. Medium acquirers are 
those in the middle quintile. For each group of deals, we report the mean CAR for deals whose announcement 
coincides with the release of a macroeconomic indicator (Indicator Deals) and for deals not coinciding with the 
release of macroeconomic indicators (No Indicator Deals). We also report the number of observations in each 
group, the difference between the mean acquirer CAR in indicator deals and non-indicator ones, the average 
relative deal size, and the percentage of indicator deals. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




Table 8 Market reaction to deal timing: A multivariate analysis 
 
Dependent Variable CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR 















































   




































































































































Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects NO NO YES YES YES YES 
N 11,605 11,605 11,605 4,637 2,368 4,600 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 
 
The table reports four models examining the wealth effects of announced acquisitions. The dependent variable in these 
models is the acquirer’s 3-day CAR. Models (1) to (3) are estimated on the overall sample used in this paper. Models (4), 
(5), and (6) are estimated on the samples of small deals, medium deals, and large deals, respectively. The White (1980) 
standard error are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 




Table 9 Market reaction to deal timing: A multivariate analysis based on the acquirer’s size 
 








Acquirer Group Small Acquirers Medium Acquirers Large Acquirers 















Control Factors YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
N 1,856 925 1,856 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.05 0.02 0.02 
 
The table reports three models examining the wealth effects of announced acquisitions within the group of small 
acquisitions across different sub-groups determined by the market valuation of the acquiring firm. Within the group of 
small deals, we sort acquirers into three groups based on their pre-acquisition equity market valuation. Small (Large) 
acquirers are those classified in the bottom (top) two quintiles of market valuations. Medium acquirers are those in the 
middle quintile. The three models control for the same factors that are included in Model (4) (Table 8). The White (1980) 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 




Table 10 The effect of unresolved uncertainty of the acquirer’s risk-adjusted returns 
























































Control Factors YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects NO YES NO YES 
Year Effects NO YES NO YES 
N 4,637 4,637 1,856 1,856 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 
The table presents four models aiming to highlight the effect of unresolved uncertainty for the deals announced on indicator 
days. Models (1) and (2) are estimated on the full sample including small acquisitions. Models (3) and (4) limit the analysis 
to deals announced by small acquirers (bottom two quintiles in the sample of small deals). High Uncertainty is a dummy 
variable assigned the value of 1 if the Jurado et al. (2015) 12-months-ahead macroeconomic uncertainty index by the end 
of the deal announcement month exceeds the 80th percentile in the sample, and 0 otherwise. The models control for the 
same factors that are included in Model (4) (Table 8). The White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for an accurate 




Table 11 Endogeneity and switching regression analyses 
 





 Equation Selection (Probit) Indicator Day Non-Indicator Day 


















































































Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
N 4,517 2,340 2,177 

















Panel C: Switching effects under low uncertainty 
Outcome\Group - Indicator Day Non-Indicator Day 
Actual CAR - 2.73*** 1.99*** 
Hypothetical CAR - 2.20*** 2.41*** 
Improvement - -0.53** 0.51** 
Panel D: Switching effects under high uncertainty 
Outcome\Group - Indicator Day Non-Indicator Day 
Actual CAR - 0.95* 1.82*** 
Hypothetical CAR - 2.14*** 0.94* 
Improvement - 1.19*** -0.88*** 
 
The table presents the endogeneity and switching regression analyses of the effect of the deal timing on the acquirer CAR. In Panel A, we 
report a Probit selection model (Model (1)) in addition to the variation in the acquirer CAR for deals announced on indicator days (Model 
(2)) and the variation in the acquirer CAR for deals announced on non-indicator days (Model (3)). The starting year for the sample is 1989 
to allow us to control for the acquirer’s average synergetic abilities and announcements on indicator days in the previous three calendar 
years. In Panel B, we report the estimates and standard errors of the Rhos and Sigmas that evaluate the impact of selection bias on our 
conclusions. In Panel C, we report the outcome of the What-If analysis on the sample of deals whose announcements do not coincide with 
high Jurado et al. (2015) uncertainty index (less than the 80th percentile in the sample). For deals on indicator and non-indicator days, we 
report the average CAR, the hypothetical CAR, and the difference between the hypothetical and actual CAR. The description of the 
estimation approach is discussed in Appendix B. In Panel D, we replicate the same approach for deals whose announcement coincides with 
high uncertainty by the end of the deal’s announcement month (higher than the 80th percentile in the sample). Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for an accurate 




Table 12 PSM Analysis 
 
Panel A: Logit model 













































Panel B: Matching Results for CAR 
Matching Algorithm Caliper Matching (No Replacement) 
Caliper 0.1 
Matched Observations per Treated Deal 1:1 
Number of Treated Observations 2,045 
Number of Control Observations  2,045 
 𝐴𝑇𝑇 (%) (Abadie and Imbens (2006) Standard Errors) 
0.82*** 
(0.29) 
Coefficient of Indicator Day 
1.10*** 
(0.304) 
Coefficient of Indicator Day × High Uncertainty 
-2.08*** 
(0.75) 




Panel C: Covariates’ Balancing 












Propensity Score 0.52 0.51 0.00 0.52 0.52 0.11 
Full Stock 0.23 0.28 0.00 0.26 0.25 0.39 
Full Cash 0.52 0.47 0.00 0.48 0.50 0.12 
Diversified 0.41 0.40 0.64 0.42 0.41 0.42 
ln(Acquirer Market Value) 4.61 4.71 0.03 4.69 4.73 0.36 
Private 0.67 0.66 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.90 
Subsidiary 0.23 0.23 0.78 0.23 0.23 0.91 
Acquirer Market-to-Book Value 3.15 3.34 0.04 3.22 3.22 0.99 
Macroeconomic Uncertainty 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.89 0.89 0.12 
Acquirer Sigma 3.23 3.22 0.87 3.17 3.23 0.37 
Synergetic Abilities 0.75 0.40 0.01 0.61 0.52 0.45 
Indicator Day Frequency 0.37 0.30 0.00 0.32 0.30 0.65 
 
The table reports the outcome of the propensity score matching analysis on the sample of small target acquisitions (bottom two quintiles of the distribution). 
The main treatment variable is the announcement of the deal on a day when at least one influential macroeconomic indicator is released. The starting year for 
the sample is 1989 to allow us to control for the acquirer’s average synergetic abilities and announcements on indicator days in the previous three calendar 
years. Panel A presents the logit model used to explain the choice of the timing announcement, with the dependent variable as Indicator Day. Panel B presents 
the outcome of the matching algorithm with caliper 0.1 and without replacement. We report the number of matched observations to each treated one and the 
number of treated and control observations on the matched sample, in addition to the estimated ATT with the Abadie and Imbens (2006) standard errors. We 
also report the coefficients of Indicator Day, Indicator Day × High Uncertainty, and High Uncertainty from the regression with the same specification as Model 
(2) (Table 10) on the matched sample. Panel C provides an example of the matching exercise’s success by representing the balancing of the propensity scores 
and the key empirical variables. The mean value of each of these variables in the treated group and the control group, and the bootstrapped p-value from the 
t-test of the null hypothesis that the difference is statistically equal to 0, are reported before and after matching. Standard deviations are reported in 





Table 13 Market reaction to deal timing under expansions and recessions 
 
Panel A: Multivariate Analysis of BHAR 
Post-Acquisition Returns BHAR3 BHAR3 BHAR6 BHAR6 BHAR3 to 6 BHAR3 to 6 

















































































































































































Monthly Market Returns and Uncertainty Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 11,605 11,605 11,605 11,605 11,605 11,605 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Panel B: Relative Drifts in Small Non-Indicator Deals 
Post-Acquisition Returns 𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝑵𝒐𝒏−𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓 𝑫𝒂𝒚,𝟑 𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝑵𝒐𝒏−𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓 𝑫𝒂𝒚,𝟔 𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝑵𝒐𝒏−𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓 𝑫𝒂𝒚,𝟑 𝒕𝒐𝟔 








Panel A of this table reports six models explaining the variation in the post-acquisition Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHAR). Models (1) and (2) analyze the variation in the acquirer’s 3-month BHAR. Models (3) and (4) analyze the variation 
in the acquirer’s 6-month BHAR. Models (4) and (5) analyze the variation in the acquirer’s BHAR between the 3rd and 6th 
month (inclusive) after the acquisition. Models (1), (3), and (5) do not control for the acquirer’s sigma, while the remaining 
models control for this factor. All models control for the market returns and the level of the Jurado et al. (2015) 
macroeconomic uncertainty index in each month. Panel B reports the BHAR based on the matching of each small deal on a 
non-indicator day to a comparable small deal on an indicator day. The matches are chosen to have the smallest differences 
in market and market-to-book valuations, provided that these differences do not exceed one standard deviation. The 
(White, 1980) Standard deviations error are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 




Table 14 Deal completion in response to the market’s announcement period reaction across different deal sizes 
 
 All Deals Deals on Indicator Days Deals on Non-Indicator Days 
 
All Completed Withdrawn 
% of 
Withdrawn All Completed Withdrawn 
% of 
Withdrawn All Completed Withdrawn 
% of 
Withdrawn 
 Panel A: All 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  −3% 2,587 2,370 217 8.4% 1,244 1,135 109 8.8% 1,343 1,235 108 8.0% 
−3% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  0% 2,602 2,450 152 5.8% 1,311 1,239 72 5.5% 1,291 1,211 80 6.2% 
0% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  3% 2,719 2,603 116 4.3% 1,392 1,333 59 4.2% 1,327 1,270 57 4.3% 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 ≥  3% 3,743 3,501 242 6.5% 1,918 1,781 137 7.1% 1,825 1,720 105 5.8% 
 Panel B: Small deals (Bottom two quintiles) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  −3% 988 946 42 4.3% 493 465 28 5.7% 495 481 14 2.8% 
−3% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  0% 972 934 38 3.9% 478 463 15 3.1% 494 471 23 4.7% 
0% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  3% 1,037 1,003 34 3.3% 560 542 18 3.2% 477 461 16 3.4% 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 ≥  3% 1,645 1,546 99 6.0% 877 821 56 6.4% 768 725 43 5.6% 
 Panel C: Medium deals (Middle quintile) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  −3% 483 447 36 7.5% 243 224 19 7.8% 240 223 17 7.1% 
−3% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  0% 563 542 21 3.7% 300 290 10 3.3% 263 252 11 4.2% 
0% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  3% 623 602 21 3.4% 322 311 11 3.4% 301 291 10 3.3% 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 ≥  3% 697 663 34 4.9% 350 329 21 6.0% 347 334 13 3.7% 
 Panel D: Large deals (Top two quintiles) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  −3% 1,116 977 139 12.5% 508 446 62 12.2% 608 531 77 12.7% 
−3% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  0% 1,067 974 93 8.7% 533 486 47 8.8% 534 488 46 8.6% 
0% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  3% 1,059 998 61 5.8% 510 480 30 5.9% 549 518 31 5.6% 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 ≥  3% 1,401 1,292 109 7.8% 691 631 60 8.7% 710 661 49 6.9% 
 
The table presents the status of the deal (completed vs. withdrawn) based on the market’s initial response. We divide the market’s response into four groups: 𝐶𝐴𝑅 <
 −3%, −3% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  0%, 0% ≤  𝐶𝐴𝑅 <  3%, and 𝐶𝐴𝑅 ≥  3%. For each group, we report the numbers of completed and withdrawn deals in addition to the percentage 
of deals that are withdrawn. We apply this approach for deals whose announcement coincides with releases of key economic indicators and for deals whose announcement 
does not coincide with such releases. Panel A applies this analysis to the whole sample, Panel B applies this analysis to small deals (bottom two quintiles), Panel C applies 













Target Size Small Medium Large 
Model Type Logit Logit Logit 



































































































Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
N 4,637 2,368 4,600 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.21 0.21 0.28 
 
The table reports the outcome of three logit models on the sample of small, medium, and large deals, 
respectively. The dependent variable in all models is Withdrawn, which is assigned the value of 1 if the deal 
is withdrawn, and 0 otherwise (i.e. if the deal is completed). All models control for industry and year effects. 
N indicates the number of observations. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for an 




















Model Type Logit Logit Logit 











































Control Factors YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
N 4,637 2,368 4,600 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.20 0.18 0.16 
 
The table reports the outcome of three logit models on the sample of small, medium, and large deals, respectively. These 
models evaluate the role of large volatility spikes at the time of the deal’s announcement on the acquirer’s tendency to 
withdraw the deal in response to a significant negative CAR. The dependent variable in all models is Withdrawn, which 
is assigned the value of 1 if the deal is withdrawn, and 0 otherwise (i.e. if the deal is completed). All models control for 
industry and year effects. N indicates the number of observations. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for an 
accurate description of the variables. 
